mosley jones iii

According to David Kay, Saddam was anything but givden up making WMD

Saddam, at least as judged by those scientists and other insiders who
worked in his military-industrial programs, had not given up his aspirations
and intentions to continue to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even those
senior officials we have interviewed who claim no direct knowledge of any on-going
prohibited activities readily acknowledge that Saddam intended to resume these
programs whenever the external restrictions were removed. Several of these officials
acknowledge receiving inquiries since 2000 from Saddam or his sons about how long it
would take to either restart CW production or make available chemical weapons.


In the delivery systems area there were already well advanced, but undeclared,
on-going activities that, if OIF had not intervened, would have resulted in the
production of missiles with ranges at least up to 1000 km, well in excess of the
UN permitted range of 150 km. These missile activities were supported by a serious
clandestine procurement program about which we have much still to learn.


In the chemical and biological weapons area we have confidence that there were at
a minimum clandestine on-going research and development activities that were embedded
in the Iraqi Intelligence Service. While we have much yet to learn about the exact
work programs and capabilities of these activities, it is already apparent that these
undeclared activities would have at a minimum facilitated chemical and biological
weapons activities and provided a technically trained cadre.

According to do***ents and testimony of Iraqi scientists, some of the key technical
groups from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program remained largely intact, performing work
on nuclear-relevant dual-use technologies within the Military Industrial Commission (MIC).
Some scientists from the pre-1991 nuclear weapons program have told ISG that they believed
that these working groups were preserved in order to allow a reconstitution of the nuclear
weapons program, but none of the scientists could produce official orders or plans to support
their belief.


In some cases, these groups performed work which could help preserve the science base and
core skills that would be needed for any future fissile material production or nuclear
weapons development.


Several scientists - at the direction of senior Iraqi government officials - preserved
do***ents and equipment from their pre-1991 nuclear weapon-related research and did not
reveal this to the UN/IAEA. One Iraqi scientist recently stated in an interview with ISG
that it was a "common understanding" among the scientists that material was being preserved
for reconstitution of nuclear weapons-related work.

http://mosley.arach.net.au/pub/docs/kay.htm