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http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...7-3-2004_pg3_1

Daily Times, Pakistan
Monday, March 08, 2004

EDITORIAL
Former DG-ISI's ‘admission'

Mr Javed Ashraf Qazi, former Director-General of Inter-Services
Intelligence and currently a senator, is reported to have said that:
"We must not be afraid of admitting that Jaish [Jaish-e Mohammad] was
involved in the deaths of thousands of innocent Kashmiris, in the
bombing of the Indian parliament, in Daniel Pearl's murder and in
attempts on President Pervez Musharraf's life". This statement is as
close to the truth as one can get. Of course, Mr Qazi has not revealed
anything new. But his statement amounts to an admission of sorts and
is important because it brings on semi-official record what some have
known and said and suffered for a long time. The JM "boys" have now
turned against their former "masters and handlers". It was inevitable.
Someone in the intelligence establishment should have seen it coming
and taken steps to avoid the discomfort and embarrassment caused
subsequently by it. But no one did. .....

...... Even if India had conceded Kashmir, thereby eliminating the
need for low-intensity jihad, then too these groups would have turned
inwards. Their next jihad would have been to turn Pakistan into a
Sunni theocratic state. Post-September 11 events have merely acted as
a catalyst for this dichotomy to come into play.

Of course, none of this bothered the military. While civilian analysts
were looking at the cost of the exercise and beyond into the post-low
intensity war period, the military, like all bureaucracies, was
focusing on the job at hand. The cost of pitting willing and motivated
non-state actors against the adversary's army seemed eminently
sensible and operationally feasible.

This leads us to the other problem of whether such decision-making can
be left to the military. Even now, the military has woken up to the
issue only because the groups pose an operational challenge to it.
That is why it has become imperative from the military's operational
perspective to put down its erstwhile allies. But the basic problem of
national security decision-making and what political processes should
lead to it remains unresolved. Mr Qazi's statement has only
highlighted the problem, not solved it. .....

...... Is General Musharraf today more amenable to understanding the
limitations of the military? If yes, would he accept, as a corollary,
that his agenda of giving the military exclusive oversight of the
political process is an untenable exercise? It doesn't seem like that
to us. This creates another disconnect: between his correct
foreign-policy decisions and his tactical measures at home. If he
understands where the problem of extremism is coming from, as we think
he does on the basis of what Mr Qazi has said, then should he not
trace the problem back to the ‘first cause uncaused'?