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Genocide of 101 children through CIA-introduced dengue epidemic

COMPENSATION CLAIM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

Expert witnesses testify, Mothers accuse
courtesy of http://www.granma.cu/cubademanda/ingles/index.html

SILVIA Torres Lara lost her 12-year-old daughter in less than 24 hours.
"They admitted her into Abalí Hospital (in the capital). She had a
fever, but was talking. During the night they informed me that her
condition was grave. Before going to sleep she gave me a big kiss that
I can still feel. She died in the early hours of the morning. Now the
time has come for me to be able to come here (to the court). On behalf
of my daughter and other mothers I accuse the United States. Don’t they
know what they did to us, the mothers?"

The emotional atmosphere in the Supreme Court’s main hall on July 20
was particularly somber. Lawyer Juan Mendoza requested that an event
with national repercussions be laid before the court: the dramatic 1981
epidemic of hemorrhagic dengue which occasioned over 300,000 cases of
sickness and the death of 158 persons, 101 of them children.

The 12th hearing of evidence session in the case of the People of Cuba
vs. the Government of the United States was entirely dedicated to
testimonies from expert witnesses, affected mothers, pediatrists and
nurses.

The first to testify was Doctor Pedro Mas, head researcher at the Pedro
Kouri Institute of Tropical Medicine, and a virologist of international
repute, who gave an exhaustive explanation of the different types of
dengue fever, its transmission, locations where it was present at the
time and the situation in Cuba at that juncture.

Mas made reference to various investigations and a 1975 national survey
which revealed that the last appearance of the virus in the country
dated back to 1940, in spite of the fact that the disease was widely
prevalent in the Caribbean Basin.

The microbiologist subsequently spoke of the first epidemic of dengue
fever type 1, in 1977, confirmed not only by Cuban scientists but, via
the World Health Organization (WHO), at the dengue fever reference
center, based in the Walter Reed Institute in the United States. Dr.
Mas himself delivered samples to this institute, which corroborated
that it was dengue fever type 1.

In relation to the 1982 epidemic, the scientist stated that the
Institutes of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene and Epidemology diagnosed
the virus as dengue fever type 2, which was not present in the
Americas, nor in countries with which Cuba maintained relations.

This testimony was expanded on by Francisco Machado, Doctor in Chemical
Science at the Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology Center, who
presented an expert-witness report compiled by an investigative
commission set up at the time and composed of Cuban and foreign
specialists, which interviewed hundreds of expert witnesses and studied
thousands of clinical histories of the 1981 epidemic.

"We reflected on three aspects: in 1981, did the U.S. Army and the
specialized services of the CIA possess the technical and scientific
capacity to utilize the dengue virus for military or terrorist ends?
Was dengue fever type 2 present in a particular part of the world and
could it have arrived in Cuba via migratory flows? And how could dengue
type 2 have reached the island?"

In particular, Dr. Machado made reference to declassified U.S.
documents on the utilization of dengue fever as a biological weapon;
experiments on breeding mosquitoes, dengue’s vector, in Fort Derrick,
Maryland; and a report from the U.S. Army’s Medical Research
Development Command on the existence of a protective vaccine against
Dengue-2.

"The first point was demonstrated. The United States did possess the
technical and scientific capacity (production of the transmissive agent
and the vaccine) to utilize dengue as a biological weapon."

In relation to the commission’s second point of investigation, Dr.
Machado explained that they had access to WHO, Pan-American Health
Organization (PHO) and USSR Ministry of Health sources, plus those of
countries that possibly had dengue fever in their territories.

"There were no outbreaks in Oceania, nor in South East Asia, nor in
Africa (only in Nigeria, with which country Cuba had no migratory
relations); and, according to the PHO, no cases of dengue-2 had been
recorded after 1978 in Latin America and the Caribbean. This led to the
conclusion that the virus could not have been imported through
migration."

Finally, he gave an exhaustive testimony on the propagation of the 1981
epidemic based on one district - Baluarte - in the capital municipality
of Boyeros, in the vicinity of the José Martí International Airport.

The first child died in April, he noted and, in May, there were 200
cases of the disease. In June, there were 500 cases in the capital, and
the epidemic had spread to the provincial capitals of Pinar del Río,
Santiago de Cuba, Villa Clara, Holguín, Matanzas, Guantánamo and
Granma.

Machado recalled that during the central event for the 26th of July,
President Fidel Castro spoke about the epidemic and the suspicion that
it had been expressly introduced into Cuban territory.

The morning session also heard the testimony of Carlos Dotres, current
minister of public health, who was head of the Pediatrics Group in the
capital and a pediatrist at the Pedro Borrás Hospital.

"Evaluating the situation," he informed the court, "I can say that, in
1981, we faced the gravest health situation ever to have confronted our
country, with tens of thousands of persons hospitalized, and over
10,000 in shock and bleeding."

He explained that, according to specialized literature on the subject,
dengue-2 can be fatal in 40-50% of cases, and that only through the
will of the government and the tens of millions of dollars directed -
with great difficulty and obstacles - to the purchase of medicines and
other supplies, was the death of between 40-4,5000 persons prevented."

As Dr. Dotres affirmed: :This biological aggression was a genocidal
act."

Rosa Acuña’s son was 10 years old. "They took him into intensive care
in Borrás hospital (in Havana province) and I never saw him again. He
died of hemorrhagic dengue. He was my only son, a healthy, happy child.
I accuse the government of the United States of having introduced
dengue fever and having made so many Cuban homes places of mourning."

"They did everything they could for my five-year-old daughter in the
William Soler Hospital," affirmed Inocencia Ledón, "but she died and I
authorized an autopsy to help save other children. Thank you to those
who are sending us death charges, but I say that, with all our
heartache, you’re not going to stop us."

Casimira Camejo lost a daughter of 13 and with her, "I lost part of my
life, I can never forget what I went through with her in the hospital.
I lost her in one week, a healthy child. I want to say that with or
without food, clothed or unclothed, I will give the last drop of my
blood for this homeland."

Other mothers and relatives of the victims likewise made statements to
the court. Isnayda Marrero lost her three-year-old daughter; Zenaida
Isla, her daughter of four and a half; Dagoberto Ramos his grandson who
had just had a birthday. Testimonies of pain which should haunt the
guilty ones for the rest of their lives.

SOCIAL TENSION AND DRAIN ON ECONOMIC RESOURCES

To that human catastrophe must be added the tremendous social tension
and stretched economic resources.

That terrible stage lived through by the Cuban people is preserved in
the collective memory with great sadness, in spite of the 18 years that
have gone by since then. Testimonies presented by witnesses in the
final hearing of evidence session confirmed this.

Hector Terry, who was deputy minister of public health at the
Department of Hygiene and Epidemology in 1981, told the court that, out
of every 100 cases, three were recorded as grave. In terms of the total
of 116,000 cases, the largest outbreak was reported between July and
August, where there were days on which the country had as many as 9000
sick persons. The highest number of hospital admissions occurred in the
months of July and August, 33% of the total number of cases. In July
alone over 50,000 persons became ill.

From the outbreak of the disease, radical measures were taken with the
creation of a national operative group to confront it. Some 50
additional teaching units were set up in the country, on top of the 121
already existing. Even schools and polytechnics were utilized to
assimilate the high number of admissions, necessary in terms of
monitoring patients and preventing shock.

According to Terry, the epidemic took the country by surprise, given
that dengue fever type 2 had not been present in this hemisphere and
there was no diagnostic or treatment information whatsoever. Medical
literature provided some ideas and led them to establish a preliminary
calculation of some 3000 fatalities in the initial weeks. The country’s
effort prevented such a total being reached.

Terry also referred to a national campaign for the eradication of the
Aedes aegypti mosquito, the vector of the disease. Over 42 million
pesos were invested in this undertaking. In the case of fumigation
equipment, this had to be purchased on the international market at
three times the price, due in certain cases to the U.S. blockade which
prevented Cuba from acquiring resources produced in that country or
from subsidiaries of such companies elsewhere.

A further witness, Dr. Eric Martínez Torres, deputy medical director of
the William Soler pediatric hospital in 1981, highlighted in his
statement the dedication of technical and medical personnel at the
facility who, by sheer willpower, barely slept. Medical students and
nurses also contributed to care in hospitals, where 7000 extra beds
were provided throughout the island.

"Collective thinking," stated Martínez, "allowed for integrated
treatment of patients; all the specialists were brought in to deal with
the epidemic, cases were analyzed as a whole and thus many conclusions
on symptoms emerged."

Cuba’s experience during the hemorrhagic dengue catastrophe was adopted
by the Pan-American Health Organization.