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1 16th July 06:02
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Default Big trouble in the House of Saud (wise prophet devil energy welfare)

Big trouble in the House of Saud

Prospect Magazine -05 Sep 03

One humid evening last Ramadan in the plush garden of a villa
belonging to one of Jeddah's oldest merchant families, a select
gathering of Saudi men and women sipped orange juice and fanned
themselves as they listened to a lecture attacking Wahhabism, Saudi
Arabia's austere brand of Islam. The lecturer was Sami Angawi, a
self-proclaimed Sufi leader of the vast swathe of Saudi Arabia known
as the Hijaz, which runs along the Red Sea and is home to Islam's two
holiest cities, Mecca and Medina.

For some time after the al-Saud imposed their rule on the area in 1925
regular elections continued to be held for the town councils in Hijaz,
but by the 1960s they had been phased out. Moreover, Wahhabi Islam
imported from al-Najd, the central region, had gradually stamped out
other expressions of non-Wahhabi thinking once taken for granted in
the Hijaz cities.

With the aid of a slideshow, Angawi reminded his audience of how
Wahhabism had eroded the historic Hijazi urban culture of tolerance
and diversity. There were periodic gasps of outrage as the images
showed how Wahhabi domination had led to the destruction or neglect of
almost all of the Islamic and pre-Islamic history of the Hijaz. The
private house in Medina of Islam's prophet, Muhammad, was shown in a
state of advanced decay, the rubble finally reduced to dust under the
giant wheels of yellow bulldozers.

Angawi do***ented the destruction of historic monuments (mostly
Ottoman); the lack of tolerance for all schools of Islamic law and
thought other than the Hanbali one, from which Wahhabism derives; and
the promotion of hatred for the "infidels" - Jews and Christians - of
the West, as well as for the non-Wahhabi Muslims in their midst like
Sufis and Shiites.

One detail from that evening is proof that the west coast has
nevertheless retained its own culture: Saudi men and women sitting
next to someone who might not be a direct relative, in an audience
where only a few of the women were veiled. Some of Angawi's audience
were old enough to recall the carnage of the 1920s, when the al-Saud
unleashed an army of Wahhabi zealots against what they called the
"little infidels" of the Hijaz. Their sons and daughters, grandsons
and granddaughters - wearing modest but colourful traditional Hijazi
dresses, instead of the all-enveloping black gown of the al-Najd -
have grown up with stories about Wahhabi massacres in the nearby
mountain resort of Taif.

The climax of the slideshow was a photograph of a beautiful Ottoman
building in Medina, the roof of which had just been crushed by the arm
of a crane. On the left of the screen, an image then appeared of the
Buddha statues in Afghanistan, as they were being destroyed by the
Taliban, whose numbers had been swollen in the 1980s by Saudi
mujahideen. Then, slowly, an image of the World Trade Centre in flames
came into focus between the first two photographs. Angawi's message
was clear: the roots of global Islamic terror can be traced back to
the fanatical puritanism of the Bedouin zealots known as the Wahhabis.
It is time, he hinted, that Hijazis reclaimed their non-Wahhabi

The Western media, too, are preoccupied with Wahhabism, and the freeze
in US-Saudi relations after September 11. The fact that 15 of the 19
suicide hijackers were Saudi shook the historic oil-for-security deal
which had stood since February 1945, when the kingdom's founder, Abdul
Aziz Ibn Saud, met President Roosevelt on the USS Quincy in the Suez

The only way to root out Islamist terror, it is argued in parts of the
US media, is to take on the ruling al-Saud family, which has allowed
such extremism to fester. A consensus, inside and outside the Bush
administration, has emerged that Saudi-backed Islamic fundamentalism,
inspired by Wahhabi doctrine, is behind many of the world's conflicts
- from Algeria to Indonesia, Bosnia to Chechnya.

Wahhabism's origins can be traced to the back-to-basics ideals of an
18th-century scholar, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, whose birthplace,
al-Najd, is also the ancestral home of the al-Saud dynasty. The
followers of Abdul Wahhab, the ikhwan or brotherhood, fought alongside
the al-Saud dynasty to help it conquer the land which was unified as
Saudi Arabia in 1932. The al-Saud family and the descendants of Abdul
Wahhab have ruled the kingdom in an uneasy partnership for the past
seven decades. But it was a marriage of convenience from the start. In
Taif in the 1920s, for instance, the Wahhabis carried out their
slaughter despite protestations from Ibn Saud. And in 1931, the king
put down a rebellion in the eastern al-Hasa region by a group of
ikhwan leaders. The rebels considered him insufficiently Islamic
because he had allowed the Shiite minority to practise their rites in
private and had signed security pacts with the British, the main
colonial power. The seeds of future instability were sown - with the
House of Saud torn between a jihad-inspired religious establishment
needed to impose order at home and ties to Western colonial forces to
guarantee its external security.

Having defeated the rebels among the ikhwan, and no longer in need of
a conquering army since he had already thrown his lot in with the
British, Ibn Saud dissolved his army and used its remnants to
establish a national guard (now headed by the de facto leader, Crown
Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul Aziz). Ibn Saud proposed a pact to the less
fanatical Wahhabis who still make up the religious establishment: let
the al-Saud dynasty run the government and take care of the budget,
national security and foreign policy, and you can impose a strictly
interpreted Islamic social order and run the education and judicial
systems according to Wahhabi principles. Ibn Saud was using the
Wahhabi doctrine to pacify a diverse and often rebellious people
spread out across a largely desert country the size of western Europe.

Since September 11, 2001, the al-Saud have faced calls for change not
just from liberal Saudis in the Hijaz, but also from the kingdom's
many other aggrieved constituents, not least the tribes from the
south. Anything from 40 per cent to 60 per cent of the nearly 20
million Saudi nationals still identify strongly with a tribe.
Allegiance to tribe and Islamic heritage loosened somewhat during the
1970s oil boom, as a new national identity emerged and tribal leaders
began to receive benefits from state agencies. However, the southern
region of Asir, a remote mountainous land bordering Yemen, is still
defined by its tribal culture, and it is from there that the majority
of the Saudi hijackers came.

Most Western commentators incorrectly characterised the Saudi
hijackers as products of the dominant Wahhabi ideology. In fact, the
people of Asir, like those of the Hijaz and the Shiites of the Eastern
Province, have always been reluctant partners in the Saudi state and
never fully accepted the Wahhabi doctrine. As I found on a recent
trip, the mountains of Asir are still populated by "flowermen" - men
and boys who wear flowers and herbs in their hair and cultivate a
passion for perfume. It is also not unusual to see women driving
pick-up trucks, although Wahhabi custom means that elsewhere women are
banned from driving.

Originally part of Yemen, Asir was a small theocracy under the
descendants of a Sufi holy man, Ahmed Ibn Idris, who was revered as a
saint. But in 1922 Ibn Saud sent 6000 men to punish the Asiris for
their resistance to invading Saudi forces. Asir's incorporation into
the Saudi state was achieved mainly by Ibn Saud buying off tribal
sheikhs, and arranging marriages between the al-Saud clan and the
women of various tribes. The subsequent loyalty of the Asir tribes has
not, say dissidents, been properly rewarded. They are never considered
for the highest positions in the government and despite making up as
much as 10 per cent of the population, they do not have a single
university in their region. Power cuts are common in the cities, and
corruption among local officials is endemic.

Most people of Asir know by heart a particular Hadith, or saying of
the Prophet, to the effect that the final triumph of Islam will be
brought about by the people of southern Arabia; historically they have
resented the Bedouins of the al-Najd region, whom they consider
inferior. Many of them have been eager recruits to Osama bin Laden,
not only because he shares their Yemeni-Saudi tribal roots, but also
because, again like him, they resent being ruled by a clan which, they
believe, does not enforce its Islamic authority with sufficient rigour
and, in many cases, lives by double standards. By attacking the US
guarantors of Saudi security and survival, these tribal Saudis were
targeting the historic Saudi-Wahhabi alliance.

One Asir tribe, the one million-strong al-Ghamdi, has an especially
central role in September 11 and subsequent al-Qaeda operations in
Saudi Arabia. Five, possibly six, of the Saudi hijackers were
al-Ghamdis. The cave in Afghanistan where the plan for September 11

al-Ghamdis. The man visiting bin Laden in the video in which he
reflects on the "victory" of September 11 was called Sheikh al-Ghamdi.
At least three, and possibly four, of the al-Qaeda cell which carried
out the May 12 attacks in Riyadh this year were al-Ghamdis, including
the alleged mastermind, Ali Abdul Rahman al-Faqaasi al-Ghamdi.
However, when his capture was announced by the state-run Saudi Press
Agency, Ali al-Ghamdi's tribal name was left out and, following
protocol, none of the Saudi newspapers therefore carried it the next
day. What the media did report almost every day for the next month
were official statements and photographs showing tribal leaders from
the Hijaz and Asir meeting Crown Prince Abdullah and Interior Minister
Prince Naif in Taif, scene of the Wahhabi massacres in the 1920s. In
almost identical speeches, all these leaders pledged loyalty to the
kingdom and its "wise leadership".

Crown Prince Abdullah, a Saudi reformist, took over the day-to-day
running of the government in 1995, when his half-brother, King Fahd,
suffered a stroke. A simple, emotional man known for speaking his mind
and for shunning indulgence, Abdullah has supported moves towards
greater privatisation and diversification of the economy away from
oil. He has also spoken of the need to make ordinary citizens less
dependent on the state.

In his first government shake-up, he appointed 15 new members to the
cabinet of 29, to make better use, as he put it, of "Saudi expertise".

But Abdullah is in a minority among the upper echelons of the royal
family, most of whose senior members (unlike him, full brothers of the
king) are conservatives closely aligned with the kingdom's religious
establishment. While King Fahd remains alive, Abdullah does not have
sufficient authority and support to carry through a reform program.

Indeed, since September 11, the Islamists and conservatives in the
royal family have been able to use anti-US feeling to strengthen their
power base. The anti-Saudi media campaign in the West, coupled with
resentment at US support for Israel's suppression of the Palestinian
intifada, meant that fewer ordinary Saudis supported calls for reform
and democracy.

According to senior princes, regional elections and a radical overhaul
of the education curriculum had been edging closer before September
11. After the attacks, Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal admitted that
although he found 5 per cent of the content of the kingdom's school
books "abhorrent", to delete the offensive passages was impossible,
because the government would have laid itself open to charges that it
was acting under pressure from a "Zionist-inspired" campaign. In
addition, Angawi and anti-Wahhabi Saudis like him have been accused by
conservatives of having a pro-American agenda. They have been damned
on Islamist websites as infidels, and self-appointed Wahhabi religious
leaders have issued religious fatwas against them.

However, the domestic reform debate was not completely extinguished
after September 11. A visit by Abdullah to a slum in a Riyadh suburb
at the end of last year, broadcast live on Saudi television, focused
public attention on deprivation and inequality as never before. The
impromptu visit was organised after Abdullah tired of advisers telling
him, whenever he inquired about social conditions, that everything in
the kingdom was "perfect". The day after Abdullah's visit, all
newspapers used a front-page picture of an elderly man in his
impoverished house, his finger pointing at Abdullah's face as he
lectures the leader on the hardship suffered by hundreds of thousands
of Saudis. This image has come to define a new era in which social
issue are openly debated. Not since the days of Ibn Saud has a Saudi
leader seemed so at ease among his people, and so willing to listen.

Arabs in neighbouring countries have even started reading the Saudi
dailies because they are freer in their coverage of social issues than
their own press. The Hijaz-based Okaz daily ran a frank three-part
series by an undercover reporter on Kerantina, a slum south of Jeddah,
where prostitution, drug abuse and alcohol smuggling are rife.

For so long virtually crime-free, the kingdom is coming to terms with
a new reality caused by a population boom, rapid social change
(epitomised by near universal access to satellite television and the
internet) and a big reduction in oil revenue. Official crime
statistics are not available, but the Al-Riyadh daily has reported
that in 1999 Sharia courts dealt with 616 murder cases - the largest
number of which took place in Mecca, Islam's holiest city. "People
here are confused. They don't understand how crime can keep rising in
this Muslim society," the newspaper said in a two-page special report
on crime.

Although the kingdom applies a strict form of Sharia, which includes
public beheading for murder, drug trafficking, **** and adultery, and
which results in thieves occasionally having their hands amputated in
public, there has been an increasing recognition that the death
penalty is not working as a deterrent. There is a new emphasis on
crime prevention. The kingdom, for instance, has started holding
regular conferences on child abuse, after years of issuing statements
to the effect that "there is no child abuse in the birthplace of
Islam"; and, more astonishingly, a number of rehabilitation centres
for drug addicts have opened in the three major cities.

In the 1970s oil boom, a generation of state-subsidised Saudis grew up
with the idea that guest workers do all the work, while princes made
millions from commissions on business deals. From the time of Ibn
Saud, the Saudi state has been characterised by a system of patronage
and subsidies: first to tribal and religious leaders, then in the form
of a generous welfare state. In the two decades after the 1973 oil
embargo the kingdom's infrastructure, health and social indicators
improved faster than in any other developing country. Saudis enjoyed
at no cost, and took for granted, ever-improving levels of social

However, the vast majority of Saudis who came of age in the 1990s can
no longer look to the state for support because the government can no
longer afford to provide it. Per capita annual income is now $US8,000,
compared with $US24,000 in the 1980s, and at almost 4 per cent per
annum, Saudi Arabia has one of the highest population growth rates in
the world. Newspapers are full of stories about substandard medical
care. Unemployment is anything up to 30 per cent. And there are places
for only 30,000 school-leavers in the six universities each year,
though as many as 300,000 may have the necessary grades.

The 1998 oil slump, in which prices fell back to pre-1973 levels, was
disastrous for the Saudi treasury. Abdullah famously remarked that
Saudis "have to tighten their belts", but many ordinary Saudis
replied, in private, that if their government was asking sacrifice
from its people, then maybe it was time that the people should demand
more of the government. The al-Saud's patronage system - the basis of
the Saudi state - was crumbling.

While the outside world is ****ysing how September 11 challenged the
60-year-old US-Saudi special relationship, it has remained largely
unaware of the extent to which it also increased the pressures on
those fragile internal alliances - religious, tribal and regional -
already threatened by economic hardship. One response to this came in
August this year when Abdullah announced the establishment of the
first official Saudi think-tank, which aims to encourage debate on
tolerance and national unity. Abdullah mentioned the importance of
"national unity" four times in one sentence in the speech to launch
the think-tank, and repeatedly returned to the theme of combating
regional, tribal and ideological alliances.

Yet it would be hard to imagine a country in which the leaders are
more out of touch with the people. Up to 60 per cent of the population
is under 21, while all its leaders are over 70. Those leaders have at
least been able to enjoy the respect that oil wealth can buy beyond
their borders, but that too changed after September 11. The Saudis
suffered a devastating loss of status on the world stage. Young Saudis
studying and living outside the kingdom returned home complaining of
the hatred and discrimination they had experienced as a result of the
bin Laden connection, especially in their favourite playground, the
US. This connection was hardly played down by the July report of the
US joint congressional committee on intelligence into security
failures before September 11. It laid out a web of connections among
Saudi businessmen, the royal family, charities and banks that may have
aided the suicide hijackers. Those who have read the unpublished 28
classified pages say they even raise the possibility of a Saudi
intelligence link to some of the hijackers.

After September 11, with those Saudi students returning from the US
with stories of abuse, and with rising resentment among ordinary
Saudis at what they saw as a campaign against Islam in the Western
media, the House of Saud found itself caught between a rock and a hard
place - between maintaining its historic ties with America and
pacifying an increasingly unstable and anti-US domestic constituency.
By the beginning of this year, the word "reform" was again on
everybody's lips.

A wide range of interest groups, from the most Western/liberal to the
most traditional/Islamic, sensed the time was right to push for change
- including liberal Hijazis like Angawi in the West, persecuted
Shiites in the Eastern Province, emboldened Sunni Islamists, and
businessmen, journalists and academics suffocating under intolerable
bureaucratic constraints and censorship.

It was Abdullah who, once again, took the initiative, this time by
accepting a petition signed by 104 prominent Saudi businessmen,
intellectuals, academics and moderate Islamists. It called for a new
social contract based on the ideals of Islamic democracy and,
eventually, constitutional rule. Dozens of pro-reform articles
appeared in local newspapers, including a front-page editorial in the
government-guided Okaz entitled "Yes to Reforms". However, the Shura
council, Saudi Arabia's unelected consultative assembly, complained
that it had not had a chance to debate the petition; and a website
detailing its agenda was blocked by the government. There were other
signs that many leaders still opposed reforms. An edition of the
pan-Arab, Saudi-funded al-Hayat daily appeared with an in-house
adverti*****t instead of a planned article on the reform agenda. I was
told by Dawood al-Shirian, al-Hayat's Riyadh-based Gulf chief, that it
was removed by the ministry of information.

Khalid al-Dakhil, a Riyadh university professor and one of the
petition signatories, says that the reformists forged a tacit
understanding with Abdullah that they would not raise too noisy a
public debate. "There is fear of a backlash from the Islamists," he
told me, adding that the Crown Prince agreed that change was needed
but said he could not bring it about on his own. After a meeting
between reformers and the Crown Prince in January, Dakhil summarised
the prince's thoughts thus: "There are other forces, in the government
and in society, which have to be taken account of, and the process is
going to be a long one."

The kingdom's Shiite minority, also sensing that their time may have
come, handed their own petition to the sympathetic Abdullah. Shiites
have long complained of discrimination, saying that the Wahhabi
establishment insults their faith in school books, prevents them from
building mosques and denies them senior government jobs.

But it is among young Saudis that the greatest hopes - and fears - for
reform lie. The young are more worldly, sophisticated and urbanised
than in previous generations, and much more prepared to express
dissatisfaction with the double standards of authority figures. Saudi
****agers spend their time surfing the internet, tuning into the
Qatar-based Al-Jazeera satellite station, and ridiculing government
statements published in the state-controlled media. The language they
use when talking about the need for change draws heavily on Islamic
tradition; and because they have no other outlet for their criticisms,
they are often drawn to the one forum which gives a platform to their
concerns: Islamist websites.

If the Saudi state is incapable of political and economic reform, of a
broadly liberal kind, it will certainly not be pushed into it from
below - there are too few liberals in the kingdom to muster an
impressive mass demonstration (if they were permitted), let alone lead
a revolution. But without reform a steady build-up of tribal and
generational dissatisfaction could sweep aside the House of Saud in
the name of some new form of fundamentalism. The fear of such an
outcome lies behind continuing US support for the guardians of a
quarter of the world's oil reserves, despite the torrent of criticism
in the US media. Better to deal with the devil they know, at least for
the time being.

There are signs, as we have seen, that Abdullah and some other senior
officials do understand what is at stake. Twenty of the main
industrial sectors have now been earmarked for privatisation, and a
new comprehensive insurance law has been introduced, despite fierce
protests from Islamists that compensating for whatever Allah wills is
forbidden. Women have been given their own ID cards, and issues
related to women's rights now get extended coverage in the local
press. Censorship, too, has been relaxed, although by Western
standards it remains very restrictive. An independent human rights
body has been announced, and in June a national forum for dialogue
brought together various Saudi representatives, including Shiites,
Sunnis and reformers. The sessions, however, were held behind closed
doors, and the participants were effectively banned from talking to
the press.

For months before this year's May 12 bombings of Western residential
compounds, which killed more than 30, the government had denied there
were significant numbers of al-Qaeda sympathisers in the kingdom, let
alone cells plotting attacks. Bin Laden had issued a fatwa in 1995
stating that his followers should refrain from attacks in Saudi Arabia
because the oil industry would be needed after a revolution, but he
rescinded that fatwa shortly before the Riyadh bombings in a speech
attacking the royal family for aiding the US-led war on Iraq. (The US
campaign was co-ordinated from the Prince Sultan air base south of
Riyadh.) Since the attacks, the kingdom's main cities have been turned
into virtual garrison towns. There have been shoot-outs between
security forces and Islamist insurgents in Mecca and suspected
terrorists arrested in the second holy city, Medina. Another fight
left six Islamists and two policemen dead in al-Qassim, a region known
as the "Koran belt" in the north of al-Najd and the main Wahhabi

In the wake of the bombings, Saudi journalists talked about a brief
"Riyadh spring", in which they finally unleashed their criticism of
the religious establishment for creating the extremist environment
which produced the attackers. The reformist newspaper Al-Watan had
already started a campaign against the religious police. An op-ed
piece in the same newspaper went further. "The Individual and the
Homeland are More Important than Ibn Taymiya" by Khaled al-Ghanami
attacked the teachings of the mediaeval Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiya
(1263-1328), which form some of the primary inspiration for Wahhabi
Islam. An attack on him was an attack on the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance.
The "tacit understanding" reformers had reached with Abdullah, not to
raise a "loud debate" for fear of an Islamist backlash, had been
broken. Religious figures feared that pressure was mounting to crowd
them out of public life, and a statement by prominent clerics claimed
"extremist writers" were using the Riyadh blasts to attack them.
Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah al-Asheikh, the kingdom's top religious
authority, rejected calls to dismantle the morality police. Al-Watan's
editor, Jamal Khashoggi, was fired by Prince Naif after religious
leaders issued a fatwa calling for a boycott of the Asir-based daily.
The reformers had been silenced, at least temporarily.

Significant change is inevitable. The question is whether it will come
quickly enough, and whether the economic changes it brings will be
sufficient to address the needs of the kingdom's youth, who may
otherwise side with the radical Islamists. Since the 1940s, the House
of Saud's trump card has been its oil. But the return of Iraqi oil to
the market will further undermine OPEC, and that, coupled with the gas
reserves in the Caspian sea, will reduce Saudi Arabia's influence as a
major energy provider. At the same time, the US no longer needs Saudi
Arabia militarily. It announced the withdrawal of most of its troops
after the Iraq war; they will now be stationed in the tiny
neighbouring state of Qatar. While this removes a rallying point for
al-Qaeda, it also raises fears that, if the Saudis do not reform by
the end of the decade, the US might decide to do the job itself.
Almost all Saudi oilfields are in the Eastern Province, where the
majority are Shiites. The idea of a US occupation has already been
raised in a paper for the Pentagon's defence policy board.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia's fate will be determined by the issue of
succession. If Crown Prince Abdullah becomes king, he can choose his
own crown prince, and rumour has it he will choose someone from the
next generation of princes who, while a son of one of King Fahd's full
brothers, will also be more in touch with younger people. The idea of
Abdullah dying before King Fahd is so awful a scenario that reformers
do not like to contemplate it. However, even if he succeeds as they
would prefer, it remains a real possibility that the alliance between
the royal family and the Wahhabi establishment is so entrenched that
trying to separate them would be fatal to both. Only one thing is
certain: no other country is going to change more dramatically, and
with greater consequences for the world community, than Saudi Arabia.


John R Bradley is the managing editor of the Jeddah-based Arab News.
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2 16th July 06:02
External User
Posts: 1
Default Big trouble in the House of Saud

Good article -- thanks for posting it.

splitting the Saudi tyranny into its three natural parts:
Hejaz-alHarameyn, Nejd-Wahhabistan, and Gulf-Petrolia.
Murderers are not Martyrs!
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3 17th July 16:38
eugene kent
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Default Big trouble in the House of Saud (reality)

You zionazis are day dreaming more than facing reality.
It is Israeli and the zionists that are in deep trouble.
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4 17th July 16:38
made in america
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Posts: 1
Default Big trouble in the House of Saud (religion way sick)

The problem with you Islamic nuts is you keep calling Satan "Allah". If you
address Satan by his real name...he might help you a little more, but
calling him Allah just pisses him off and he won't help.

Instead he does stupid shit to you freaks. I can see the conversation now.

Satan: "Watch this Hitler...I'm going to convince these nuts to strap bombs
to their children"

Hitler: "No way, no one is that sick to do that, even in the name of

Satan: "See...these dumb asses will do it. They will do anything. Promise
them water and 72 skanky whores...anything"

Satan: "But if they call me Allah ONE MORE TIME...they get nothing"
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5 17th July 16:39
william s. hubbard
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Default Big trouble in the House of Saud

Deep trouble is one thing, but the Saudis and their fellow travelers are in
very deep shit; but then again they are comfortable in shit, as they cook
their food over camel shit.
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6 17th July 16:39
the holy kafir
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Default Big trouble in the House of Saud

So says the jihadi Nazi.
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7 17th July 16:40
eugene kent
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Default Big trouble in the House of Saud

Yes and they learned it all from Regan's/Bush's CIA. As they say. From one
shithead to another shithead.
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8 17th July 16:40
eugene kent
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Default Big trouble in the House of Saud

Don't you have any manners? Quoting from the manual of hog shit Shitron.
What would your dear departed Russkie Jewish Kazars think?
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9 17th July 16:40
the holy kafir
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Default Big trouble in the House of Saud

I could give a rats ass about Sharon, you're a hypocrite, I point it out, deal with it.
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10 17th July 16:40
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Default Big trouble in the House of Saud

A fantastic article! Thanks for posting.

It fills a lot of gaps in my studies...

Much appreciated.

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