Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
Epistemology 201: The Science of Science
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(Scientific Reduction)
If asked what science is, most people would reply that science is
empirical in nature and conducts experiments to falsify unsound
hypotheses. Some might also vouchsafe that mathematics is a
scientific discipline to the extent that unsound hypotheses can be
falsified through contradictions with foundational axioms. But why
do we need science at all and how is it used?
Let's look at reality in general through unscientific eyes. What we
see is a collation of events in historical terms. We see them succeed
one another and opine that various events cause one another. There is
no way to determine whether this is true in any fundamental sense,
only that history documents that various sequences of events have in
fact succeeded one another.
So, what is science is expected to do? What is apparent to everyone is
that we have one historical tapestry of events and science is expected
to make sense of that tapestry. But how to do this? Basically science
can only make sense of the tapestry by reducing the number and
complexity of causes evident for events. Science must take the run of
events evident to everyone and show which characteristics and
properties govern the emergence of certain events as manifested in the
characteristics and properties of other events.
In so doing science regresses consideration of events to properties of
events and shows how the emergence of one event is implied in the
emergence of other events. And thereby science reduces the panoply
of history to manifold considerations evident in all or most events.
Methodology
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Initially at least empirical sciences approach this reduction in the
same way mathematics does through finite tautological regression.
However, whereas mathematics regresses its observations through to
consistency with foundational axioms, through the vagaries of history
empirical sciences are left only with contradiction between empirical
observations as the basis for its regressive foundation.
Consequently empirical science has been left with no understanding of
its own intellectual mechanics. It pretends to be different from logic
and mathematics and claims no finite tautological regressions limit
its empiricism. However, this is only partly true just as it is only
partly true for mathematics and logic. None of the three have finite
ending points that limit application of the respective disciplines.
But all three have finite tautological regressions which define and
limit their starting points, what I refer to as ur regressions.
Ur Regressions for True, False, and Not
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True, False, and Not are defined in reciprocal terms in the following
way. For any empirical observation [subject] the proposition
p:[subject][not subject] is always true. And the proposition
p:[subject not subject] is always false. And the empirical observation
P:[not] is always true because the proposition
P:[not not] is always false.
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These seem to be the only reducible definitions for true, false, and
not. The problem is analogous to the definition of factorability in
mathematics where given i=j*k we have for any number, i, two factors,
j and k but only one equation, which means there is no general
solution possible for factors of i lying between 1 and i.
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In other words every empirical observation is regressable through
tautologies or it cannot be true because tautologies in the formal
sense are always true. Tautologies are not perfect, however, because
even though they account for everything true they do not account for
everything. In order to do that they would also have to account not
only for everything true but everything false as well. And we find
that perfecting ordinary tautologies requires the addition of some
component which is always false. For example, for
t:[subject][not subject]
t:[subject][not subject][subject not subject]
wherein the self contradictory alternative [subject not subject] is
appended to an ordinary tautology to form a comprehensive or perfect
tautology inclusive of all possibilities.
However such a regression through to self contradiction is not
possible in the case of one empirical observation [not] which forms
an irreducible regression directly in tautuological terms:
T:[not][not not]
inclusive of all possibilities. From which we conclude [not] or
contradiction forms the basis of all tautological regressions in
general, which in fact is exactly consistent with the form of the
tautology itself.
Regards - Lester
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